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NOTES AND COMMENTS

a waiver or abandonment of any rights which have accrued under the
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
breached contract .2 1
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Municipal Prohibition
of House to House Peddling.
A Georgia city, having statutory authority to "license, regulate and
control ... peddlers of all kinds," 1 declared by ordinance that every
solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant and transient vendor of
merchandise, who went uninvited to a private home for the purpose of
conducting business, was a (public) nuisante. 2 Held, such an unqualified provision is an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with legal
rights, in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.3
A preliminary question to be decided in every such case is: Has the
legislature given the municipality power to pass such a law? This is
of particular significance in that courts seem to find an affirmative
grant of power a persuasive argument for constitutional validity. For,
ordinances identical to the one under consideration have been upheld
in all cases when passed by cities granted the specific power to "prohibit" hawkers and peddlers. 4 Likewise, this ordinance has been upheld in the only case arising where passed by another city under the
delegated power to "regulate" similar activities. 5 Whenever a city
had neither the power to regulate nor suppress this business, such an
21In Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916),
Cardozo, J., said of such an express provision in the second contract: "The contract itself . .. says in so many words that the old contract is not to be deemed
revived, and that no rights that have accrued under it are waived. The cause of
action against the defendant was thus plainly preserved." Even such an express
reservation might leave some room for argument if the language of Mr. Justice

White in International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303, 15 Sup.
39 L. Ed. 160 (1894), is to be taken literally. In that case it was said, at
"A party cannot avoid the legal consequences of his acts by protesting
time he does them that he does not intend to subject himself to such
quences."
'LAws
OF GEORGIA 1901, Part III, Title I, Sect. 37.
2

Ct. 97,
p. 310,
at the
conse-

This ordinance is identical with that originated by Green River, Wyoming,
and upheld in Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th,

1933).

3 De Berry v. La Grange, 8 S.E. (2d) 146 (Ga. App. 1940).
'Green River v4 Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933)
rev'g 60 F. (2d) 613 (D. C. Wyo. 1932); 1cCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d)
969 (Colo. 1940) (court used this reasoning) ; cf. Goodrich v. Busse, 247 Ill. 366,
93 N. E. 292 (1910) (similar ordinance upheld for this reason).
I Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938). Accord: Ex
Parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 80 Pac. 547, 548 (1905). But cf. Cosgrove v. City
Council, 103 Ga. 835, 31 S.E. 445 (1898) ; Good Humor v. Board of Comm'rs., 124
N. J.L. 162, 11 A. (2d) 113 (1940) ; Virgo v. Toronto, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447
(1893) (passing on similar ordinances).
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ordinance has been held invalid.6 However, this distinction is rarely
articulated by the courts.
It is frequently questioned whether such activity actually constitutes a public nuisance. Although a public nuisance is indictable, a
visitation which merely offends a householder may be only a private
nuisance and not punishable as a crime. Cities cannot by ordinance
7
declare to be a public nuisance that which is not one in substance.
Although one solicitation may not, of itself, be such a nuisance as to
be punishable, the types of salesmen prohibited by the ordinance in
question are increasing to such an extent that each uninvited visit may
be deemed a public nuisance because of the frequent repetition of calls
by one solicitor after another. Such annoyances have become so general and common that a court has taken judicial notice that the frequent ringing of doorbells of private residences by the prohibited persons is in fact a nuisance to the occupants of homes. 8 After all, the
terms "public" and "private" are but labels descriptive of conclusions
yet given as reasons for decisions. In the final analysis, the problem
is whether the courts feel that there exists a public need of suppression
so as to empower the city to pass such an ordinance:
Aside from the question of authorization, the validity of such an
ordinance is usually, and particularly in a case of this nature, held
to depend upon its being a proper exercise of police power. Of necessity this power is one of indefinable flexibility, and represents an everchanging compromise in a "contest between the restraining power of
due process of law and the legitimizing energy of police control." 0 In
its liberal preient-day scope, it has been said to include interference
'Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938) ; Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air,
172 Md. 536, 192 Ati. 417 (1937) (court used this reasoning) ; McAlester v. Tea
Co., 98 P. (2d) 924 (Okla. 1940) (court used this reasoning); Orangeburg v.
Farmer, 181 S. C. 143, 186 S. E. 783 (1936); White v. Culpeper, 172 Va. 630,
1 S. E. (2d) 269 (1939).
'Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); McAlester v. Tea Co.,
98 P. (2d) 924 (Okla. 1940); White v. Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S. E. (2d)
269 (1939). But see McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d) 969, 972 (Colo.
1940); 1 Bisnop, CramINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) §234 ("whenever the public
deems an act of private wrong to be of a nature requiring its intervention for
the protection of the individual, it holds the act punishable at its own suit; in
other words, makes it a crime").
' Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
The prohibited persons frequently claim exemption from the ordinhnce on grounds
of implied invitation to call, and because usage and custom would constitute them
at least licensees. However, the ordinance simply abolishes existing implied
consent, if any, and creates a presumption of lack of consent ,intil an invitation
can be shown. Each householder may withdraw consent at any time and so
constitute persons entering, trespassers; it would be a strange anomaly in our
law if the people individually could accomplish an act which they could not do
collectively through their government. McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d)
969, 974 (Colo. 1940) ; see Windsor v. Blake, 49 N. C. 332, 334 (1875).

13

WILLOUGHBY,

1929) §1168, p. 1765.
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by the state wherever the public interests require it, since the government is obligated to protect and promote the public welfare.10 A
profitable comparison may be made between the instant ordinance and
past exercises of the police power which received judicial approval.
Hawkers and peddlers have been confined to certain districts ;11 the
ordinance in question forbids uninvited visitation of private homes.
The sale of drugs or medicines by itinerants has been forbidden;12
whereas the ordinance regulates not what is sold but only the place
of sale. To promote public order and comfort, itinerants have been
forbidden to sell within certain distances of religious meetings and
fairs.' 3 Are not people in their homes entitled to like consideration?
Since entering private premises against the consent of the owner
may be forbidden, 14 it appears that a majority of the people, acting
through their representatives, might decree any vendor's entrance to be
againat the consent of the owner, until an actual invitation is obtained.
Zoning laws go further than the ordinance in question inasmuch as
they prevent one from using his own property for certain purposes, 15
while the ordinance at issue merely declares that one shall not use
another's property for his own business purposes without the invitation
of the owner.
In Williams v. Arkansas,16 the United States Supreme Court held
valid a statute making it unlawful to solicit business on the trains or
in the depots of any railroad operating within the state, and unlawful
for any railroad knowingly to permit such practices. Certainly people
in their own homes are entitled to as much protection against unpleasantness and annoyance as those who travel, especially as the'latter
voluntarily expose themselves to business contacts, while the individual
in the home seeks escape from uninvited disturbance. The ordinance
in the principal case is not as stringent as that upheld by the above
10

Fuller Brush v. Green River, 60 F. (2d)

COOLEY,

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

613, 615 (D. Wyo. 1932); 2

(8th ed. 1927) 1226 ("The

-public need

is the polestar of the enactment, interpretation, and application of the law.").
" Ex parte Hogg, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 156 S. W. 931 (1913); Stevens
Point v. Bocksenbaum, 225 Wis. 373, 274 N. W. 505 (1937); see Ex parte
Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 395, 80 Pac. 547, 548 (1905); Note (1936) 105 A. L. R,

1051.
" Notes (1928) 54 A. L. R. 730, 735.

1" State v. Reynolds, 77 Conn. 131, 58 Ad. 755 (1904) ; Meyers v. Baker, 120
Ill. 567, 12 N. E. 79 (1887) ; State v. Cate, 58 N. H. 240 (1878); State v.
Stoval, 103 N. C. 416, 8 S.E. 900 (1889) ; State v. Read, 12 R. I. 137 (1879).
" McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d) 969, 975 (Colo. 1940); Saxton v.
Peoria, 75 Il1. App. 397 (1897) ; Brownsville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 (1875) ; State
v. Glenn, 118 N. C. 1194, 23 S. E. 1004 (1896).
15 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 Sup. -Ct. 171, 59 L. ed. 900
(1914); Hadacheck v. Sebastien, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. ed. 348
(1915); Texas Co. v. Tampa, 100 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); 2 COOLEY,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 1315 (zoning laws upheld).

" 217 U. S. 79, 30 Sup. Ct. 493, 54 L. ed. 673 (1910), aff'g 85 Ark. 464, 108
S. W. 838 (1908).
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decision, since it reserves to the householder the power to invite the
prohibited persons for any desired business. It has been said that all
lawful occupations are subject to reasonable regulations, including
licensing, and a recognized mode of regulation is by prescribing the
places where a given occupation may or may not be conducted. 1 The
ordinance in the principal case does not suppress the business of
peddling, but merely prohibits a particular phase of it in an effort to
protect the privacy of homes.
Some courts insist that if the law seeks to relieve the occupant of
the house from disturbance, then it is not sufficiently comprehensive
because it fails to cover solicitors of alms and charity. 1 8 However,
a state may, without arbitrary discrimination, direct its laws against
what it deems the existing evil, without covering the whole field of
possible abuses.' 9 And here there seems ample reason for the discrimination so as to constitute no denial of equal protection. Certainly the prohibited class is a conspicuous example of what the legislative body seeks to prevent. Solicitors of alms appear less frequently
than hawkers and peddlers and a householder is ordinarily more willing
to hear charitable requests than to be urged to buy something he does
not desire sufficiently to invite the seller onto his premises. Where
home-merchants are specifically exempted from the application of ordinances like the one in question, courts have found discrimination;20
but in the principal ordinance there is no such discrimination because
resident merchants are subject to the same restrictions.
The constitutionality of the law when applied to solicitors for outof-state firms hinges upon whether such prohibition is a direct burden
on interstate commerce. In Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,21 the
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an identical ordinance saying that
interstate commerce was only indirectly affected, and that the commerce
clause did not prevent the state from exercising its police power, at
least in the absence of Congressional regulation. A regulation discriminating against interstate commerce or designed to gain local
benefit at its expense, is almost invariably invalidated as a direct burden. 2 However, the fact that its subject matter is one not requiring
27EX parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911)
(and cases cited);
ex Parte Barmore, 174 Cal. 286, 163 Pac. 50 (1917). (D. C. Wyo. 1932).
'8Fuller Brush v. Green River, 60 F. (2d) 613
29 Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936) (citing Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160, 33 Sup. Ct. 66, 67, 57 L. ed.
164 20(1912)); 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1226.
Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 Atl. 417 (1937) (identical
ordinance with additional clause exempting home-merchants); Good Humor v.
Board of Comm'rs., 124 N. J. L. 162, 11 A. (2d) 113 (1940), rev'g. 123 N. J. L.
21, 7 A. (2d) 824 (Sup. Ct., 1939).
2165 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
185, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734, 739 (1937) (and cases cited) ; ROTSCHAEFER,
CONSTITUTIOxAL LAW (1939) 283.
22South
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uniformity of national regulation is frequently relied upon to support
Reguregulation which only affects interstate commerce incidentally.
lation accomplished by the instant ordinance seems purely a matter
of local interest, and one which affects interstate commerce only indirectly. It has been said that this type of ordinance is not aimed at
the solicitation of orders for purchase of goods which flow through
interstate commerce, but at the "place" of solicitation.2 4 The ordinance does not prohibit the former, but only the latter.
In the principal case, appellant pleaded that his constitutional rights
as a Jehovah's Witness were contravened by the ordinance.2 5 Admittedly a deprivation of the right to propogate religious belief is
unconstitutional.2 6 Yet the same clause of the Constitution also protects all from having religious beliefs of others thrust upon them against
their willY7 The Constitution does not guarantee protection to the
form of worship of a particular sect. 28 In neither the principal decision
nor in other decisions involving similar ordinances has there been any
discussion of freedom of worship. For it seems that the constitutional
guaranty of such freedom does not insure the right to sell from house
to house as the appellant was attempting to do.
Since all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law, the Georgia Court in the principal case
might well have reached an opposite conclusion. Furthermore, there
is a growing need for upholding such ordinances, since it is a matter
of common knowledge that the restricted types of persons are noticeably
increasing, to the annoyance, inconvenience, and disturbance of the
public' in their homes, against which private redress is of slight value
as a remedy. This ordinance does not prohibit business; rather it
regulates the "place" of carrying it on. There are numerous ways of
obtaining the required invitation if the property owner is really interested in the merchandise.
HARvWY A. JONAS, JR.
"' South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734 (1937); cf. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C.
115, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939); Note (1939) 18 N. C. L. REv. 48 (direct or
indirect burden of taxation on interstate commerce).
"' Green River v. Fuller Brush, 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; Green
River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936); cf. Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. ed. 982 (1925) (license
tax and examination required by ordinance for purpose of preventing fraud,
declared
direct burden on interstate commerce).
2
r De Berry v. La Grange. In appellant's brief, pp. 21 to 42, he pleaded
that his sect's Biblical Principle commanded him to go to everyone with the
scriptures, and that this ordinance prohibited that practice.
28 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 969.

Pittsburgh v. Ruffner, 134 Pa. Super. 192, 4 A. (2d) 224, 227 (1939);
2 COOLpY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 969, n. 1.
" Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. ed. 637 (1890);
Maplewood Township v. Albright, 13 N. J. Misc. 46, 176 Atl. 194 (C. 'P.,
1934); McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922).

